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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Guy Charles has pointed out to me that The Cycles of Constitutional 
Time [“Cycles”]1 does not say a lot about race.  Although statements about 
race, slavery, and Jim Crow appear at various points in the narrative,2 race is 
not an organizing theme of the book.  And yet race – and the use of race as a 
political strategy – is behind many of my claims in Cycles.  Charles’s 
suggestion inspired me to write this Article, and to tell the story of the book 
by making race the organizing principle. 
The Cycles of Constitutional Time argues that we can understand 
American constitutional development in terms of three kinds of cycles.3  The 
first is the rise and fall of regimes featuring dominant political parties.  The 
second is a very long cycle of polarization and depolarization that stretches 
from the Civil War through the present.4  The third cycle is a series of episodes 
of constitutional rot and constitutional renewal.5 
Each of these cycles has deep connections to successive political 
struggles in the United States over race and racial equality.  In each regime, 
the dominant electoral coalition is shaped by the politics of slavery (in the 
antebellum period) or race (after the Thirteenth Amendment).6  In several 
cases, the dominant coalition breaks down because of disputes about slavery 
or race.  The cycle of polarization is highly correlated with attempts by 
politicians to make race, and more generally, identity, the central questions 
that divide the two major political parties.  Finally, each period of 
constitutional rot in the country’s history has been accompanied by deep 
polarization that is connected both to increasing income inequality and to 
party coalitions divided over issues of race. 
I do not claim that race is either the sole or the dominant explanation for 
the cycles of constitutional time in the United States.  Nevertheless, as we 
shall see, race is a powerful factor, and the politics of race are an important 
driver of the cycles of regimes, polarization, and rot described in the book.  
My purpose in this Article is to highlight the role that racial politics plays in 
the transformations described in Cycles, and to show how questions of race 
are important at each stage of the story. 
 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2020). 
2. See id. at 13, 15, 18, 30, 45, 52, 62–63, 89–90, 116, 124, 135–37, 142, 161–
66, 168, 172–73. 
3. Id. at 6. 
4. Lee Drutman, American Politics Has Reached Peak Polarization, VOX (Mar. 
24, 2016), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/3/24/11298808/ american- politics- 
peakpolarization [https://perma.cc/RDL4- XM9B]; Jeff Lewis, Polarization in 
Congress, VOTEVIEW.COM (Mar. 11, 2018), https:// www.voteview.com/ articles/ 
party_polarization [https://perma.cc/5VZB- DUJA] (graph of “Liberal-conservative 
partisan polarization by chamber”). 
5. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 6. 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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II.  THE CYCLE OF REGIMES 
Because of features of constitutional design, electoral rules, and the 
development of the party system, American politics has a distinctive shape.7  
It features political regimes, long periods of time in which one party tends to 
dominate politics.  The dominant party does not win all of the elections, but it 
wins most of them and it sets the agenda for what people think is politically 
possible at a particular period of time.8  There have been six of these regimes 
in American history, each featuring a dominant party.  In each cycle a new 
dominant party rises, forms a winning coalition, dominates political agendas, 
and then slowly decays and falls apart, often the victim of its own success: 
Table 1: Regimes in American Political History, 1789-20209 
(Years of White House control in parentheses) 
Name Years Dominant 
Party 
Opposition Parties 





























7. Jack M. Balkin, Rot and Renewal: The 2020 Election in the Cycles of 
Constitutional Time, 13 NORTHEASTERN  U.  L. REV. 617, 622–24 (2021). 
8. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 13. 
9. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 15.  In Table 1, I begin each regime in the year a 
new president takes office, while in the book I begin with the date of the preceding 
election that shifts power. 
10. I count Andrew Johnson as a Democratic president, even though he ran as 
Lincoln’s running mate in 1864 as part of a national unity ticket.  
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As we trace the rise and fall of these coalitions, we can see the role that 
race plays in each of them. 
A.  Political Regimes in the Antebellum Era 
The first transition between political regimes occurred in the election of 
1800, when Thomas Jefferson’s Republicans defeated the Federalist Party of 
John Adams and Alexander Hamilton.  Jefferson (and Aaron Burr) won the 
Electoral College by only eight votes over John Adams, seventy-three to 
sixty-five.11  But Jefferson, his critics said, rode into the White House “on the 
shoulders of slaves.”12 
The source of this accusation is the 1787 Constitution’s three-fifths 
clause.13  Counting slaves as three-fifths of a person increased the share of 
congressional representation for the slave-holding states, an electoral 
advantage that slowly decreased over time as the North and West become 
more populous.14  Because each state received electoral votes equal to the sum 
of its senators and representatives, the three-fifths clause gave slave-holding 
states an advantage not only in Congress but also in electing the president 
through the Electoral College system.15  Without this boost in political power, 
Jefferson probably would have lost the 1800 election.  Because the North and 
West soon began to grow in population, the Jeffersonian takeover of 
American politics might have been delayed by several election cycles – if it 
ever occurred at all. 
From the Founding to the Civil War, the three-fifths clause affected who 
became president.16  It made a slaveholding state, Virginia, the most powerful 
state in the Union, with the largest number of electoral votes until 1812, when 
New York finally surpassed it.17  With the exception of one term by John 
Adams, from 1789 to 1824 the Presidency was occupied by four Virginia 
 
11. See 1800 Presidential Election, 270TOWIN, 
https://www.270towin.com/1800_Election/index.html [https://perma.cc/E2WZ-
GVCW ] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).  
12. GARRY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 2 
(2005) (quoting the Mercury and New-England Palladium of Boston, January 20, 
1801). Sean Wilentz argues that this does not take into account “the Federalists’ 
deliberate suppression of the Jeffersonian vote in key Northern states.” SEAN 
WILENTZ, THE POLITICIANS AND THE EGALITARIANS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 105 (2016). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
14. MICHAEL F. CONLIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR 90-91, 96 (2019). 
15. Id.; MICHAEL TODD LANDIS, NORTHERN MEN WITH SOUTHERN LOYALTIES 
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE SECTIONAL CRISIS 5 (2014). 
16. CONLIN, supra note 16, at 120–21. 
17. See 1812 Presidential Election, 270TOWIN, 
https://www.270towin.com/1812_Election/index.html [https://perma.cc/4GLG-
JQFP] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021). 
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slaveholders – George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and 
James Monroe.18  John Adams’s son, John Quincy, occupied the White House 
for another interregnum of four years.19  After that, during the Jacksonian 
regime that began following the 1828 election, the president was either a 
Southerner or a Northern politician willing to accommodate the South.20 
The three-fifths clause also gave the South extra leverage in legislation.  
For example, until 1850, the South demanded and received parity in the 
admission of new slaveholding and non-slaveholding states.21  This gave it 
numerical equality in the Senate even as the population of non-slaveholding 
states increased. 
The three-fifths clause also helped ensure that the Supreme Court would 
be friendly to the interests of slavery.  As the country moved westward, the 
number of judicial circuits expanded.22  This led Congress to increase the 
 
18. Akhil Reed Amar, Actually, the Electoral College Was a Pro-Slavery Ploy, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoral-
college-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/UX7D-96EY] (“Eight of the first nine 
presidential elections were won by candidates who were plantation owners from 
Virginia”); Elizabeth Nix, Which states have produced the most U.S. presidents?, 
HISTORY (Sep. 10, 2014), https://www.history.com/news/which-u-s-states-have-
produced-the-most-presidents [https://perma.cc/57WG-65ZS]; Evan Andrews, How 
Many U.S. Presidents Owned Enslaved People?, HISTORY (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.history.com/news/how-many-u-s-presidents-owned-slaves 
[https://perma.cc/D2K3-PLLP]; THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Chronological List of 
Presidents, First Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html [https://perma.cc/L3JZ-PWRU] 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
19. THE WHITE HOUSE, John Quincy Adams, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/john-quincy-adams/ 
[https://perma.cc/5KL5-VMPM] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021). 
20. Amar,  supra, note 18 (“every president until Abraham Lincoln was either a 
Southerner or a Northerner who was willing (while president) to accommodate the 
slaveholding South”); see also PAUL FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE 51, 84 (2011) 
(noting Fillmore’s support for the Compromise of 1850). 
21. CONLIN, supra note 16, at 105–109. 
22. JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS 
OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 124, 127, 139 (2012); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial 
Independence, Judicial Accountability, And The Role Of Constitutional Norms In 
Congressional Regulation Of The Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 171 (2003) (“As new states 
entered the Union, new judicial districts were created to service the new states, new 
district judges were added to staff the new judicial districts, new circuits were added 
to include the new states, and new Supreme Court Justices were added to oversee the 
new circuits.”). 
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number of Supreme Court Justices.23  Each Justice of the Supreme Court was 
supposed to ride circuit – travel around and hear federal cases in the group of 
states assigned to them.24  By convention, each Justice was supposed to be an 
inhabitant of one of the states in the circuit assigned to them.25  Jacksonian 
Democrats made sure that a majority of the circuits were composed of 
slaveholding states.26  This, in turn, helped ensure that a majority of Justices 
were from slaveholding states, or were otherwise sympathetic to the interests 
of slavery.27 
The cumulative advantages created by the three-fifths clause allowed 
Jefferson’s Republicans, and later Andrew Jackson’s Democrats, to dominate 
American politics until the Civil War.28  Because it shaped the nature of 
representation, the three-fifths clause also shaped the distinctive ideology and 
interests of the Jeffersonian regime and later, the Jacksonian regime.  The 
representational boost to slaveholders meant that the dominant party from 
1800 to the Civil War would seek not only to protect slavery, but also to 
extend its spread throughout the new territories that the United States acquired 
through purchase and conquest. 
During the Jacksonian regime that succeeded the Jeffersonian regime, 
the dominant party was the country’s first mass political party: the “party of 
democracy,” or the Democratic Party.29  The Jacksonian coalition championed 
the expansion of suffrage to white working men and the rights of ordinary 
 
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 168. 
25. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
EVIL 149 (2006)(“The presidential practice of appointing one Supreme Court justice 
from each circuit guaranteed a Southern majority on that tribunal.”). 
26. Mark Graber, “No Better Than They Deserve:” Dred Scott And 
Constitutional Democracy” 34 NO. KENTUCKY L. REV. 589, 604 (2007) (“Federal law 
... structured the federal judicial system in ways that guaranteed that a majority of the 
justices on the Supreme Court would be citizens from slave states.”). 
27. Id. at 609–610 (“The Court that decided Dred Scott had a southern majority 
because Jacksonians in the executive and legislative branches of the government 
passed legislation placing five of the nine federal circuit court districts entirely within 
the slave states, and presidents who depended on southern votes ensured that one 
representative from each federal circuit district sat on the Supreme Court.”); Howard 
Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 514 
(2002) (“[T]o ensure the protection of Southern regional interests . . . the slave states 
were divided into five circuits, meaning that they would enjoy a majority on the 
Supreme Court.”) 
28. See LANDIS, supra note 17, at 5 (2014) (“the combination of the Three-Fifths 
Clause and the subservience of Northern Democrats gave the South almost 
unchallenged domination over the federal government in the antebellum era.”) 
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working men against financial elites.30  But the Jacksonian coalition was 
hardly egalitarian.  It depended on the exclusion of women, Native 
Americans, and Blacks from governance.31  
The Jacksonian regime and its governing coalition were made possible 
and kept in place by a racially exclusionary politics.32  That politics, in turn, 
made the Jacksonian coalition increasingly captive to the interests of slavery 
– which opponents called the Slave Power.33  As I discuss later on,34 the first 
key episode of constitutional rot, in the 1850s, is due to the fact that the 
defense and expansion of slavery had become a dominant force in American 
politics. 
B.  The Republican Regime 
The Republican Party, which began in 1854, sought to combat the rot 
caused by the dominance of the Slave Power in American politics.35  Thus, 
race played an important role in the rise of the next political regime, the long 
Republican regime in which the GOP was the dominant political party from 
1860 to 1932.36  That regime and its governing coalition emerged out of the 
struggle over the expansion of slavery in the federal territories. 
In its early years, and especially after the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870, it seemed as if a central goal of the regime would be to 
 
30. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: FROM LINCOLN 
TO JEFFERSON 513 (2005) (“At bottom, the Jackson Democracy was chiefly what its 
proponents said it was – a political movement for, and largely supported by, those who 
considered themselves producers pitted against a nonproducer elite.”). 
31. GERALD LEONARD AND SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: 
DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–
1830S 147, 175–77, 207–209, 220 (2019). 
32. Id.; see also DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848 280 (2007) (“In the South, Jackson's 
popularity was enhanced by the feeling that only he could be relied upon to maintain 
white supremacy and expand the white empire, to evict the Indian tribes, to support 
and extend slavery.”). 
33. WILLS, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining that the Slave Power was facilitated 
by the three fifths clause and other pro-slavery parts of the Constitution). 
34. See infra Part IV-B. 
35. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY 6–7 (2014); WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856 357–365 (1987); Matthew Karp, The People’s 
Revolution of 1856: Antislavery Populism, National Politics, and the Emergence of 
the Republican Party, 9 THE JOURNAL OF THE CIVIL WAR ERA 524–545 (2019). 
36. See supra Table 1; BALKIN, supra note 1, at 14. 
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protect and defend the rights of the freedmen, and that this regime would be 
backed by a multi-racial coalition of whites and Blacks.37  But as the years 
wore on, the Republican regime became less concerned about racial equality 
and more concerned about the defense of business interests. 
Black voting rights became important to the Republican coalition as a 
result of the Reconstruction Amendments.38  In 1866, when Congress debated 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Black suffrage was a radical idea.39 Instead of 
guaranteeing African Americans the right to vote, Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment fashioned a compromise: states that denied Black men the right 
to vote would lose a proportionate share of representatives in the House.40  
That provision, it turns out, was never enforced.41  
In the meantime, however, Congress took control of Reconstruction 
from President Andrew Johnson and refused to allow the former Confederate 
states to reenter the Union until these states adopted new state constitutions 
and elected new state governments that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.42  
Congress further required the former Confederate states to allow both Blacks 
and whites to vote for delegates to these new state constitutional 
conventions.43  The predictable result was that the newly organized southern 
 
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 15th Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution: Primary Documents in American History, 
https://guides.loc.gov/15th-amendment [https://perma.cc/X5FA-3H23] (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2021). 
38. Jordan Grant, In 1868, Black suffrage was on the ballot, NATIONAL MUSEUM 
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, February 27, 2020,  
https://americanhistory.si.edu/blog/black-male-suffrage [https://perma.cc/MA2T-
VXKK]; Robert C. Kennedy, On This Day: On February 24, 1866, Harper's Weekly 
featured a cartoon about voting rights for African Americans., N.Y. TIMES, (2001), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/022
4.html [https://perma.cc/LXT7-2A6Q]. 
39. Grant, supra note 38; A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. 
Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=072/llcg072.db&recNum=611 
[https://perma.cc/8VTK-BQTN] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
40. U.S. CONST. AMENDMENT XIV, § 2. 
41. See Earl M. Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Section 2 and the Evolution of American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149, 178 (2015);  
George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 108–116, 124 
(1961). 
42. Grant, supra note 38; THE WHITE HOUSE, Andrew Johnson, The 17th 
President of the United States, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-
house/presidents/andrew-johnson/ [https://perma.cc/K2L4-SZQY] (last visited Feb. 
14, 2021). 
43. See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AND REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 356–67 (7th 
ed. 2018); 14 U.S. STAT. 428, 429 (1867); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon 
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states guaranteed Black suffrage, and because Blacks were a large proportion 
of the population, they became a powerful force in Southern politics.  
As a result, many Republicans changed their minds about Black 
suffrage, realizing that it would guarantee Republican political 
competitiveness – if not political control – in the South.  By 1868, when the 
states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, Black suffrage in the South had 
fundamentally changed the political calculus.44  Republican politicians 
quickly sent a Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing Black suffrage, to the 
states, and it was ratified in 1870.45  
If one had stopped the historical narrative at that point, one might have 
predicted that the dominant coalition in the new Republican regime would be 
a multi-racial coalition in which both whites and Blacks would participate in 
governance, especially at the state level.  But it soon became clear that this 
strategy for maintaining political dominance would not succeed.  It did not 
succeed because of enormous resistance – and political terrorism – by white 
Southerners.46  The “massive resistance” following Brown v. Board of 
Education47 was nothing compared to white Southern resistance to equal 
citizenship for Blacks in the former Confederacy.  Only resolute military 
control could suppress this resistance and protect Black civil rights.  But 
Northern will to maintain this control – which was both expensive and 
unpopular – gradually gave way, partly as a result of the Panic of 1873.48 
Over the course of the late nineteenth century, Republicans slowly 
stopped pressing for Black civil rights.49  Democrats regained the House of 
 
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 92 GEO. L. J. 259, 270–71, 271 n.67 (2004). 
44. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 46, at 259; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO 
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 89-94 
(2000); Grant, supra note 38. 
45. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, supra 
note 37. 
46. DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND RACE: REACTION AND 
REFORM, 1900-1917 1, 17–18 (2005); STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: 
BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 272–73, 
287–89, 310–312 (2003). 
47. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally 
NUMAN V. BARLETY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S (1997). 
48. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 19. 
49. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 
AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 22–50 (1966) (arguing that Republicans reoriented 
their party toward business interests, making Black civil rights a lower priority). 
9
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Representatives in the 1874 elections, and the two parties remained highly 
competitive throughout the Gilded Age.50  Democrats regrouped in the South, 
and so-called Redeemer governments reestablished white hegemony.51  
Although Blacks could still vote in the South during this period, they 
gradually lost political control.  Republicans, meanwhile, turned their 
attention to economic nationalism and the protection of railroads and business 
interests.  To be sure, Republicans continued to “wave the bloody shirt,” 
blaming the Democrats for the Civil War, but their devotion to Black civil 
rights increasingly took a back seat to other issues.52 
One key turning point came during Benjamin Harrison’s administration, 
when Republicans had control of the White House and both Houses of 
Congress for the first time since the end of Reconstruction.53  This proved to 
be their last chance to push through civil rights legislation protecting Black 
voting rights.  Harrison, a former Union general who supported Black civil 
and political rights, pushed for passage of the Lodge Bill, an early precursor 
of the Voting Rights Act.54  But enough Northern and Western Republicans 
failed to support it, and it died.55 
By this point, Republicans had effectively given up on protecting Black 
voting rights to bolster their political coalition.  Instead, they focused on a 
different strategy for maintaining political control.  They admitted new 
sparsely populated states to the Union, with the hope that these new states 
would usually vote Republican, giving them an advantage in the Senate.56 
By the end of the Gilded Age, Republican politicians had moved on to 
new sets of issues.  Although they were still the Party of Lincoln, they had 
mostly lost interest in protecting the rights of Blacks.  A Supreme Court 
controlled by Republican appointees gave its blessing to Jim Crow in 1896 in 
Plessy v. Ferguson.57  Democratic-controlled Southern states began to strip 
Blacks of their voting rights through new state constitutions and 
 
50. ROBERT W. CHERNY, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE GILDED AGE 1868-1900 
47–48, 141–43 (1997). 
51. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 21–24. 
52. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 22–50; CHERNY, supra note 52, at 33–34. 
53. Vincent P. De Santis, Benjamin Harrison and the Republican Party in the 
South, 1889-1893, 51 INDIANA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 4, 279 (1955). 
54. Allan B. Spetter, Benjamin Harrison: Life Before the Presidency, UVA 
MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/president/bharrison/life-before-the-
presidency [https://perma.cc/9P8S-K25F]. 
55. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 34. 
56. Mark A. Graber, Constructing Constitutional Politics: The Reconstruction 
Strategy For Protecting Rights 99-100, 104-05, 
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2394&conte
xt=fac_pubs [https://perma.cc/6XWW-EBNJ]; Heather Cox Richardson, When 
Adding New States Helped the Republicans, THE ATLANTIC, (September 19, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/when-adding-new-states-helped-
republicans/598243/ [https://perma.cc/4UC5-26B9]. 
57. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
10
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disenfranchisement schemes aimed both at Blacks and impoverished whites.58  
In 1903, in Giles v. Harris,59 the Supreme Court announced that it would not 
and could not do anything to stop determined attempts at the 
disenfranchisement of Black voters in Southern states.60 
Instead, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence developed a different focus: 
the protection of capital.  In 1888, the Court declared that corporations were 
persons under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,61 giving railroads 
and other businesses new constitutional means to resist economic regulation.  
In 1895, the Court struck down the federal income tax in Pollock v. Farmer’s 
Trust and Loan Co.62  And in 1897, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,63 the Court 
recognized freedom of contract as a specially protected constitutional liberty, 
inaugurating the Lochner era.  In this way, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
originally designed to protect the rights of Black citizens, became a vehicle 
for protecting the rights of businesses.  These decisions reflected the evolution 
of the Republican regime during the Gilded Age.  The Republican Party 
transformed from a multi-racial coalition devoted to equal rights for all 
citizens into a coalition primarily concerned with the protection of business 
interests, including the interests of railroads and other corporations.  
Meanwhile, the opposition party, the Democrats, remained the party of the 
South, and actively fought against the protection and expansion of Black civil 
and political rights. 
 
 
58. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. 
COMM. 295, 301–304 (2000); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN 
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE, RESTRICTION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY 
SOUTH, 1880-1910 238-65 (1974); SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 24–26. 
59. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
60. Id. at 488 ("relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the 
people of a state and the state itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and 
political department of the government of the United States.") 
61. Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 
188-89 (1888); see also Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 
118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)(reporter’s note of statement by Chief Justice Waite that all 
of the Justices believed that corporations were persons under the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
62. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429, modified on 
reh’g, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (striking down the 1894 Federal Income Tax). 
63. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (recognizing constitutional 
liberty of freedom of contract). 
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C.  The New Deal/Civil Rights Regime 
Until the 1896 election, issues of religion, race, and the memory of the 
Civil War were key points of contention between the two major political 
parties.64  After 1896, politics began to focus on different issues, and political 
polarization began to recede.65 
For many years, the Democratic Party seemed to have little to offer 
African Americans.  That began to change with the New Deal.66  The Great 
Migration brought Black people from Southern states where they could not 
vote to Northern states where they could.67  Republican abandonment of Black 
civil rights created an opening for Northern Democrats to compete for Black 
votes.  If both parties were racist, Black Americans could decide which party 
offered the greatest chances for economic improvement.  Despite the racism 
of Southern Democrats, Black voters recognized that the Democratic coalition 
promised greater economic benefits and began to vote accordingly.68  By the 
1936 election, approximately seventy percent of African Americans voted for 
Franklin Roosevelt.69  
The New Deal coalition made many different kinds of economic reforms 
possible, and it brought large numbers of Black voters into the Democratic 
Party.  Political depolarization allowed cross-party alliances on different 
issues.  But the success of the New Deal coalition always rested on a Faustian 
bargain concerning race.70  That coalition held together because of a racial 
compromise between Northern liberal Democrats and Southern Democrats, 
mostly at the expense of African Americans.71  Northern and Southern 
Democrats often agreed on many questions of economic regulation.  But they 
disagreed strongly on questions of race. 
To extent that the New Deal coalition held, Southern conservatives and 
Northern liberals could inhabit the same party, and the Democrats could 
 
64. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 166. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Isabel Wilkerson, The Long-Lasting Legacy of the Great Migration, 
SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/long-lasting-legacy-great-migration-
180960118/ [https://perma.cc/YM4P-3LGB]. 
68. See NANCY JOAN WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY  OF LINCOLN: BLACK 
POLITICS IN THE AGE OF F.D.R xiv (1983) (arguing that despite Roosevelt’s lack of 
interest in promoting civil rights, African Americans began to vote Democratic 
because of the substantive economic benefits promised by the New Deal). 
69. Brooks Jackson, Blacks and the Democratic Party, FACTCHECK.ORG, (April 
18, 2008), https://www.factcheck.org/2008/04/blacks-and-the-democratic-party/ 
[https://perma.cc/YXX2-3N6Z]. 
70. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR 
TIME 17–18 (2013). 
71. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD 
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005). 
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remain the dominant political force, with each side of the coalition working 
across the aisle with Republicans on particular issues.  But the coalition began 
to fray almost as soon as it was established.  Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully to 
purge conservative Southern Democrats in the 1938 election, and Southern 
conservatives, in turn, objected to demands from liberals in the party.72 
Harry Truman was far more overt in his support for Black civil rights 
than Roosevelt ever dared.73  He desegregated the armed forces in 1947 and 
ran on a civil rights plank in the 1948 election.74  In response, Southern 
Democrats bolted from the party, and Senator Strom Thurmond ran for 
president as a Dixiecrat.75  Meanwhile, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s two 
successful presidential runs in 1952 and 1956 began to attract more 
Southerners to the Republican Party.76  These tendencies would accelerate in 
1964, when Barry Goldwater, an opponent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
gained the Republican nomination.77  Lyndon Johnson won a landslide victory 
that year, but Goldwater carried five states in the Deep South, long a 
Democratic stronghold.78  That result was a harbinger of things to come. 
Differences over race eventually doomed the New Deal coalition, 
although the crackup would take many decades.  The civil rights era was a 
turning point.  The social unrest of the 1960s and mobilizations for Black civil 
rights and women’s liberation put continuous stress on the Democrats’ 
coalition.79  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 transformed American politics.80  
The South became increasingly competitive for both parties, and because of 
Republican political strategies on race, eventually a Republican bastion. 
 
72. SUSAN DUNN, ROOSEVELT’S PURGE: HOW FDR FOUGHT TO CHANGE THE 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY 7 (2010). 
73. MICHAEL R. GARDNER, HARRY TRUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS 109 (2002). 
74. Id. at 96, 111–13. 
75. Id. at 101–02. 
76. See Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Campaigns and Elections, 
UVA MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/campaigns-and-
elections [https://perma.cc/CJY3-EYAS]. 
77. Suzanne McGee, How Barry Goldwater Brought the Far Right to Center 
Stage in the 1964 Presidential Race, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/barry-
goldwater-1964-campaign-right-wing-republican [https://perma.cc/839P-BQBH] 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
78. Id. 
79. Democratic Party, supra note 31. 
80. Voting Rights Act of 1965, HISTORY, (Nov. 9, 2009), 
https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-rights-act 
[https://perma.cc/MK65-T4D7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
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By the 1970s, the country had entered what we now call the culture 
wars.81  Opposition to desegregation, court-ordered busing and affirmative 
action became key issues in American politics.82  A racist demagogue, 
Alabama Governor George Wallace, managed to attract a large number of 
Democratic voters in the 1968 presidential election.83 
Goldwater’s 1964 campaign showed that if race became the central issue 
of national politics, the South would abandon the Democrats.84  Wallace 
showed that a reactionary combination of populism and racism was attractive 
to many voters in the New Deal coalition.  After Wallace, Republican 
politicians and the conservative activists who formed the New Right learned 
how to use wedge issues of culture and race to successfully break apart the 
New Deal Democratic coalition.85  They succeeded in forming a new 
conservative coalition that included many white ethnics, Catholics, and 
evangelical Christians.86  This eventually became the Reagan coalition that 
won the White House for three consecutive terms in 1980, 1984, and 1988.87 
D.  The Reagan Regime and the Culture Wars 
The Reagan Regime marked the triumph of the conservative movement 
in American politics.  Building on the political lessons of the 1960s and 1970s, 
Republican politicians and conservative political entrepreneurs discovered 
that the key to becoming the nation’s dominant party was to fight the culture 
wars and make issues of race, religion, morality, and culture the central 
 
81. ANDREW HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE 
CULTURE WARS 2 (2015)(describing the birth of the culture wars out of the tumult of 
the 1960s). 
82. Id. at  63, 105. 
83. The standard account of Wallace’s political career is DAN T. CARTER, THE 
POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1995). 
84. Ron Elving, Dixie's Long Journey From Democratic Stronghold To 




85. See Aram Goudsouzian, Why the Republican Party is so polarizing, WASH. 
POST, (Nov. 6, 2018 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/06/why-republican-party-is-so-
polarizing/ [https://perma.cc/V5HN-CGU2] (arguing that the Republican Party's 
strategy of polarization began with George Wallace's 1968 campaign and the 
emergence of the New Right). 
86. A. James Reichley, The Reagan Coalition, 1 BROOKINGS REV. 6, 6 (1982). 
87. Thomas B. Edsall & Richard Morin, Reagan’s 1984 Voter Coalition is 
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questions of American politics.88  The left wing of the Democratic Party had 
become very liberal on both cultural and economic issues in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.  The sexual revolution, student protests against the Vietnam 
War, and opposition to desegregation, busing, and affirmative action roiled 
the country.89 This unrest and uncertainty gave Republicans an opportunity to 
remake politics along conservative lines. 
The very idea of a “culture war” suggests a conscious decision to 
develop new issues and reframe existing social controversies in ways that 
make the central battles of politics about race, religion, identity, and culture 
rather than about economics and class.  Even if Republicans lost many 
individual battles – for example, on issues of sex equality or sexual morality 
– fighting the culture wars was good politics because it was in their interest to 
split the Democratic coalition apart, while it was in the interest of Democratic 
politicians to keep the old New Deal coalition together for as long as possible.  
For many years, Republican success in prosecuting culture war issues posed 
a seemingly intractable problem for Democrats: how to simultaneously appeal 
to voters who were liberal on issues of race, religion, and culture while 
retaining the loyalty of more conservative white working-class voters, 
especially in the Midwest and South. 
Race, of course, was not the only issue in the culture wars.  Conservative 
politicians successfully combined their opposition to desegregation and 
affirmative action with a focus on crime, social disorder, appeals to patriotism, 
and cultural issues like the decline of the nuclear family, pornography, drugs, 
abortion, and homosexuality.90  Nevertheless, racial issues and appeals to 
racial resentment were always an important element in the culture wars.91  
These issues and appeals allowed conservative Republicans to attack social 
welfare and re-distributional programs by successfully associating them with 
racial minorities in the minds of voters and by arguing that these programs 
undermined individual responsibility and personal morality.92  In addition, by 
emphasizing the country’s social disorder, demanding strict criminal 
 
88. See E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS: DEATH OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 12 (1991) (arguing that cultural issues allowed Republicans to 
split the New Deal coalition). 
89. See HARTMAN, supra note 81, at 25-26, 35, 63, 105; The 1970s, HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/1970s-1 [https://perma.cc/4E83-HZ9W] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2021). 
90. See DIONNE, supra note 90, at 79. 
91. STUART STEVENS, IT WAS ALL A LIE: HOW THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BECAME 
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penalties, and criticizing constitutional restraints on law enforcement, 
Republicans played on stereotypes about Black criminality.93 
Ronald Reagan’s famous attacks on “welfare queens” who cheated the 
government and “strapping young buck[s]” who spent their food stamps on 
expensive steaks exemplified conservative racial framings.94  Conservative 
politicians and their allies in conservative media realized that many issues that 
might seem unrelated to race could nevertheless be racialized and connected 
to stereotypes about African Americans.95  In this way, conservatives 
succeeded in turning economic and class issues that had united the New Deal 
coalition into cultural issues that divided it. 
Conservative Christians were an important part of the Reagan coalition.  
But even here, race helped attract religious conservatives to the Republican 
cause.96  For example, the Reverend Jerry Falwell, who founded the Moral 
Majority, was first drawn to the New Right not because of opposition to 
abortion but because the federal government refused to allow tax exemptions 
for private “segregation academies” that discriminated on the basis of race.97  
Falwell’s decision to focus on abortion came in the late 1970s, well after Roe 
v. Wade was decided.98 
The reductio ad absurdum of the strategy of using racial resentments to 
maintain the Republican coalition was the 2016 election of Donald Trump, an 
unvarnished racist demagogue.  Racial resentment was an important factor in 
 
93. Id. 
94. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL 
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 4, 58–59 
(2015). 
95. Id.; STEVENS, supra note 93. 
96. Randall Balmer, The Real Origins of the Religious Right, Politico, (May 27, 
2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-real-
origins-107133 [https://perma.cc/ZD8S-WT59]. 
97. Id.; KATHLEEN M. SANDS, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS WARS THE EMBATTLED 
HEART OF OUR PUBLIC LIFE 209 (2019). 
98. Balmer, supra note 98 (“[I]t wasn’t until 1979 – a full six years after Roe – 
that evangelical leaders, at the behest of conservative activist Paul Weyrich, seized on 
abortion . . . [because] the anti-abortion crusade was more palatable than the religious 
right’s real motive: protecting segregated schools.”). 
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Trump’s victory,99 and Trump found multiple ways to invoke race and racial 
stereotypes both during the 2016 campaign and throughout his presidency.100  
Republican political strategies on culture and race made Republicans 
increasingly a white person’s party.  Moreover, the party slowly traded off 
college-educated professionals and suburbanites – who became independents 
or Democrats – for white working-class voters, especially in the South and 
rural areas of the nation.101  The culture wars helped the party gain and keep 
political power for decades, but it created a serious long-term problem.  First, 
Republicans became less attractive to younger and college-educated voters.102  
Second, as the country has become more racially diverse, the percentage of 
white voters has decreased with each election cycle.103  This created 
increasingly difficult choices about how to keep the party dominant 
politically.  Republican politicians might back away from strategies of racial 
resentment in order to attract Black, Asian, and Latino voters who might be 
attracted by the party’s cultural and religious conservatism and its promises 
of economic opportunity.  Or Republican candidates might push even harder 
 
99. Alan Abramowitz & Jennifer Mccoy, United States: Racial Resentment, 
Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America, ANNALS, 681 ANNALS 
OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 137, 140–46 (2019), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716218811309 
[https://perma.cc/7AUE-LX4P]; Matthew Fowler, Why 41 percent of white 
millennials voted for Trump, WASH. POST, (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/15/racial-
resentment-is-why-41-percent-of-white-millennials-voted-for-trump-in-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/4EBQ-GWLF]; Marc Hooghe & Ruth Dassonneville, Explaining 
the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, 51 
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 528 (2018); Carlos Algara & Isaac Hale, Racial attitudes & 
political cross-pressures in nationalized elections: The case of the Republican 
coalition in the Trump era, 68 ELECTORAL STUD. 102207 (2020); Brian F. Schaffner, 
Matthew Macwilliams, & Tatishe Nteta, Understanding White Polarization in the 
2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q. 
9 (2018). 
100. See infra notes 161–166. 
101. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 163. 
102. Id. at 18. 
103. Ruth Igielnik & Abby Budiman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic 
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on racial and cultural appeals in order to turn out an ever-larger percentage of 
the white vote.104 
Donald Trump doubled down on the second strategy in 2016 and 
2020.105  Although Trump managed an Electoral College victory in 2016, he 
never managed to win the popular vote, and the Democrats increased their 
popular vote majority in 2020.106  Indeed, since George H.W. Bush’s victory 
in 1988, the Republican Party has won the popular vote for the Presidency 
only once, in 2004.107  This is not good news for a political party that wants 
to remain dominant. 
Although we appear to be nearing the end of the Reagan regime, the 
2020 election suggests that it is not over yet.  Although Joe Biden won the 
White House, Democrats lost seats in the House of Representatives.108  They 
underperformed expectations in the Senate, finally achieving a 50-50 tie 
following the January runoffs in Georgia.109  This means that Democrats will 
have trouble achieving their most ambitious goals for reform.  The January 6, 
2021, insurrection at the Capitol also greatly complicated matters.110  It 
showed that conspiracy theories arguing that the 2020 election was stolen – 
designed to de-legitimate the incoming Biden Administration – may persist 
 
104. Danielle Kurtzleben, Trump Defied The 2013 GOP Autopsy. So Was It A 
'Failure'?, NPR, (July 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/16/891590318/trump-
defied-the-2013-gop-autopsy-so-was-it-a-failure [https://perma.cc/T467-W2AC]. 
105. Id. 
106. National Popular Vote Tracker, COOK POLITICAL REPORT, 
https://cookpolitical.com/2020-national-popular-vote-tracker 
[https://perma.cc/HF8L-GA47] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021) (showing a 2.4% shift in 
the popular vote from the 2016 election). 
107. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 18. 
108. Kelsey Snell, House Democrats Dissect What Went Wrong And How To 
Rebound From Losses, NPR, (Nov. 15, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/15/934586955/house-democrats-dissect-what-went-
wrong-and-how-to-rebound-from-losses [https://perma.cc/5WYU-CNSM]. 
109. Democrats Take Senate Control With Georgia Wins - Live Results and 
Analysis, Wall Street Journal, Jan 9, 2021 at 4:27 pm ET, 
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/georgia-senate-runoff-elections-2021 
[https://perma.cc/UJ5B-WV3H]. 
110. Ed Pilkington, Incitement: A Timeline of Trump’s Inflammatory Rhetoric 
Before the Capitol Riot, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2021/jan/07/trump-incitement-inflammatory-rhetoric-capitol-riot 
[https://perma.cc/TW9Z-LQZB]; Woman Dies After Shooting in U.S. Capitol; D.C. 
National Guard Activated After Mob Breaches Building, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/01/06/dc-protests-trump-rally-
live-updates/ [https://perma.cc/FEB2-EG4D]; Maggie Haberman, Trump Told Crowd 
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for years, and that many Republican politicians are willing to play along with 
these theories for political gain. 
Whether the Reagan regime is truly on its way out or manages to 
reconstitute itself will have a lot to do with how the Democrats manage to deal 
with the crises of the present moment: the coronavirus pandemic and the 
economic contraction that accompanied it.  A great deal will also turn, 
however, on how the two parties handle the question of race in their evolving 
coalitions. 
For many years, the Republican Party has tried to win elections primarily 
with white voters.  As noted above, in the long run this is a losing proposition.  
In the 2020 election, however, Donald Trump attracted a slightly larger 
number of Black and Latino voters – particularly male voters – than he had in 
2016.111  The increased share was relatively small nationwide, but it was more 
significant in certain areas of the country like Florida and Texas that are 
crucially important to the Republican coalition.112 
Trump’s modest inroads with non-white voters probably surprised 
Democrats who assumed that these voters would never vote for an overt racist 
like Trump.  But this neglects several factors.  First, minority voters are not 
monolithic.  They have conflicting and cross-cutting values, which will 
become ever more salient as the percentage of non-white voters in the 
population grows.113  Second, many non-white voters are culturally 
 
111. Chris Alcantara, et al., How independents, Latino voters and Catholics 
shifted from 2016 and swung states for Biden and Trump, WASH. POST, (Nov. 12, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections/exit-polls-changes-
2016-2020/ [https://perma.cc/95YA-54A6] (noting that Trump's share of the non-
white vote improved from 21% in 2016 to 26% in 2020); Avik Roy, No, Trump Didn’t 
Win ‘The Largest Share Of Non-White Voters Of Any Republican In 60 Years’, 
FORBES, (Nov 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2020/11/09/no-
trump-didnt-win-the-largest-share-of-non-white-voters-of-any-republican-in-60-
years/?sh=4863cb054a09 [https://perma.cc/GYJ3-33AM] (noting that Trump 
improved from an 8% to a 12% share of the Black vote, a 29% share to a 32% share 
of the Latino vote, and a 29% to a 31% share of the Asian vote). 
112. Alcantara et al., supra note 113; Matt Grossman et al., Why Latinos Moved 
Toward Trump (and Why Most Are Still Democrats), NISKANEN CTR, (Dec. 2, 2020), 
https://www.niskanencenter.org/why-latinos-moved-toward-trump-and-why-most-
are-still-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/2SGF-VCDJ]; Arelis R. Hernández & Brittney 
Martin, Why Texas’s overwhelmingly Latino Rio Grande Valley turned toward Trump, 
WASH. POST, (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/texas-latino-
republicans/2020/11/09/17a15422-1f92-11eb-ba21-f2f001f0554b_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7TQ-6LVH]. 
113. Michael Powell, Liberals Envisioned a Multiracial Coalition. Voters of 
Color Had Other Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 16, 2020), 
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conservative and aspire to be prosperous members of the middle class; this 
may attract them to the Republican Party.  Third, Republican attacks on 
Democrats as socialist may succeed with non-white voters opposed to 
socialism, which they identify with authoritarian and anti-democratic 
governments abroad.  Fourth, some non-white voters may expect that in a 
country with two white-dominated parties, both parties will either be racist or 
unresponsive to demands for racial justice; if so, they may vote for whichever 
party has the best chance of improving their lives economically.  Fifth, non-
white voters are not evenly distributed around the country.  Republicans may 
find ways to appeal to those minorities, for example in Texas and Florida, who 
are most crucial to their electoral success.  Sixth, and finally, in order to be 
competitive nationally, Republicans do not have to win majorities of minority 
voters as long as they can increase their margins slightly in particular areas of 
the country, a task that both George W. Bush and Donald Trump have shown 
is entirely achievable.114 
Because the racial demographics of the country are evolving, and the 
percentage of white voters is likely to decrease with each election cycle, the 
next regime will be led by whichever party can best take advantage of these 
changes in the voting population.  Because of decades of Republican appeals 
to white racial resentments, the Democrats have a clear head start.  Their 
coalition is already multiracial; they have developed, elected, and appointed a 
far larger group of racial and ethnic minorities to offices and judgeships, and 
Democratic politicians have made appeals to Black, Latino, and Asian voters 
a priority.115  Although the future remains uncertain, Democrats still have a 





114. Giovanni Russonello and Patricia Mazzei, Trump’s Latino Support Was 
More Widespread Than Thought, Report Finds, New York Times, April 2, 2021, 
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How Latinos Voted in 2004, Pew Research Center, June 27, 2005, 
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[https://perma.cc/8FUM-3GX3]; Julio Ricardo Varela, The Latino Vote in 
Presidential Races: 1980–2012, Latino USA, October 29, 2015, 
https://www.latinousa.org/2015/10/29/the-latino-vote-in-
presidential-races/ [https://perma.cc/TK76-R4MV].  
115. Nancy Scherer, Diversifying The Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy 
For The U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. L. Rev. 587, 588-89 (2011); Sara 
Atske, More minority federal judges have been appointed under Democratic than 
Republican presidents, Pew Research Center, July 19, 2016, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/more-minority-federal-judges-
have-been-appointed-under-democratic-than-republican-presidents/.examples of 
non-white elected/appointed judges and politicians from Democratic party 
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Nevertheless, when the loss of political power is at stake, almost all 
political parties can find ways to adapt.  In recent years, the Republican Party 
has mostly relied on the strategies of a party that knows it is losing majority 
support: stocking up on life-tenured judges, gerrymandering districts, 
restricting access to the franchise, and alleging election fraud.  But these 
strategies for minoritarian rule will only succeed in close elections.  If the 
Republican Party is to remain viable as a majority party in a representative 
democracy, it will have to attract an ever-larger share of racial and ethnic 
minorities in the future.  Doing this will require the Republican coalition to 
reconstitute itself, and this, in turn, will affect the second cycle of 
constitutional development – political polarization. 
III.  THE CYCLE OF POLARIZATION AND DEPOLARIZATION 
In Part II, I described how issues of race have shaped the rise and fall of 
political regimes in the United States.  In this Part, I explain the role that race 
played in the cycle of polarization and depolarization.  
Before the Civil War, American politics became deeply polarized over 
the slavery issue, but along sectional rather than strictly partisan lines.  
Multiple parties went in and out of existence.117  Our modern party system 
began shortly before the Civil War, when the Republicans joined the 
Democrats as the country’s two major parties.  These parties were defined 
first by the Civil War and then by the memory of the Civil War.118  This meant 
that race would remain an important dividing line in American politics.  
During the late nineteenth century, the Republicans were more likely to 
defend the rights of Black people (although, as noted in Part II, their interest 
in protecting Black rights eventually declined), while Democrats, especially 
in the South, pushed for a return of white rule and white supremacy.  
Similarly, most Democrats supported Chinese exclusion policies, while the 
issue split Republicans in the West and East.119 
Polarization between the parties during the Gilded Age also concerned 
religious identity.120  Protestant Republicans in the North were more likely to 
 
117. Political Parties in the United States, 1820-1860, 
https://www.ncpedia.org/sites/default/files/documents/nchist_political-parties-
1820.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KMS-MHH6]. 
118. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 22–23. 
119. BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, 
AND THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA 46–49 (2018); Jungkun Seo, Wedge-issue 
dynamics and party position shifts: Chinese exclusion debates in the post-
Reconstruction US Congress, 1879–1882, 17(6) PARTY POL. 823–47 (2010). 
120. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 28–29; GIENAPP, supra note 37, at 365–67. 
21
Balkin: Race and the Cycles of Constitutional Time
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
464  MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
be hostile to and suspicious of Catholic immigrants from Europe, most of 
whom joined the Democratic Party.121  Republicans and Democrats also 
squared off over issues of personal morality, especially alcohol consumption 
and gambling.122  Thus, the late nineteenth century had its own version of the 
culture wars, structured, as in our own day, around questions of race, religion, 
immigrant status, and morality.123 
Political polarization tends to cause and be caused by growing 
inequalities of income and wealth.  That is, polarization and income inequality 
tend to egg each other on.124  As we have seen in our own age, political 
fighting over cultural issues diverts politics from questions of economic 
equality, makes political compromise more difficult, and hinders the passage 
of redistributive legislation.  A politics dominated by culture wars allows 
politicians to shape the law to benefit wealthy backers, thus increasing income 
inequality still further, and making the wealthy even more politically 
influential.  Growing income inequality, in turn, tends to intensify cultural and 
racial divisions. 
Just before the Civil War, income inequality in both the North and South 
had increased significantly.125  But the Civil War and emancipation destroyed 
a great deal of wealth.  Even so, political polarization between Democrats and 
Republicans remained high because of deep bitterness over the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.  During the Gilded Age, income inequality increased rapidly, 
helping to keep polarization high, and large waves of immigration, especially 
Catholic immigration, helped stoke the late nineteenth century’s version the 
culture wars. 
Political competitiveness, which often leads to political gridlock, also 
tends to increase party polarization.126  One reason why gridlock promotes 
polarization is that partisans become frustrated and increasingly desperate to 
break through the political blockages in the system and push their own 
agendas.  A second reason that gridlock leads to polarization is that political 
gridlock maintains the status quo and blocks legislation that would ameliorate 
increasing income and wealth inequality. 
Following the 1874 elections (when the Democrats retook the House for 
the first time since the Civil War), the two parties became highly competitive, 
 
121. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 27, 29–30. 
122. Id. at 25, 28–29. 
123. Id. at 29–31. 
124. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 34; NOLAN MCCARTY, POLARIZATION: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 80-81 (2019) (noting reasons why polarization and 
income inequality may cause each other). 
125. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 34; Peter H. Lindert & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 
American Incomes 1774– 1860 24, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 
w18396, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147106. 
126. FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL 
CAMPAIGN (2016) (arguing that political competitiveness encourages polarization and 
gridlock). 
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and for about two decades, American politics was essentially gridlocked.127  
There were many close presidential elections, and in two cases (1876 and 
1888), the popular vote winner lost to the winner of the Electoral College, a 
feat that would not be repeated until our own Second Gilded Age, also a period 
of highly competitive parties and intense political polarization.  As a 
gridlocked national government did little to deal with the mounting problems 
and pervasive corruption of the Gilded Age, the culture wars raged on.  Issues 
of race, religion, morality, and identity dominated Gilded Age politics, and 
Republicans repeatedly waved the bloody shirt and blamed Democrats for the 
Civil War, labeling them the party of rebellion and immorality.128 
Polarization stayed high throughout the nineteenth century until the turn 
of the twentieth century, at which point politics began to depolarize rapidly.129  
One reason is that that newer generations – and new political issues – replaced 
older ones.130  Issues of class and economics, which were long sidelined 
during the culture wars of the Gilded Age, came to the forefront.  The public 
tired of Gilded Age corruption, and inequalities of wealth had become so great 
that pressures for reform finally broke through.  Movements for progressive 
reforms developed in both parties, symbolized by Theodore Roosevelt in the 
Republican Party and Woodrow Wilson in the Democratic Party.131 
A less innocent explanation for the political depolarization that begins 
in the 1890s is that Republicans gave up on trying to protect Black civil and 
political rights.  Whites in the two parties moved toward an accommodation 
on the issues of race that had divided them since the Civil War.132  This 
accommodation meant that, after 1896, Republicans acquiesced in the South 
disenfranchising its black citizens and establishing one-party rule in the 
South.133 
Thus, the gradual decline in political polarization between the two 
parties at the turn of the twentieth century was achieved at the expense of 
 
127. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 46–50. 
128. Id. at 22–24. 
129. Lewis, supra note 4. 
130. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 27; see generally R. HAL WILLIAMS, REALIGNING 
AMERICA: MCKINLEY, BRYAN, AND THE REMARKABLE ELECTION OF 1896 
(2010)(describing new political issues and coalitions in the election of 1896). 
131. See George W. Ruiz, The Ideological Convergence of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson, 19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD, Q.159, 159–60 (1989). 
132. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 35 (“By the 1890s the White North seemed to 
crave reconciliation with the White South.”). 
133. Id. (“The Party that initiated Reconstruction found that it no longer needed 
the South and its black voters to win national elections.”) 
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African Americans.134  The predictable result was acceptance or at the very 
least acquiescence in vicious forms of racism and racial violence.135  The 
Progressive Era witnessed the birth of the second version of the Ku Klux 
Klan.136  By 1920, the Klan had millions of members, and had become a 
powerful force in politics, not only in the South, but also in the Northeast and 
Midwest.137  The depolarization of American politics allowed Democrats and 
Republicans to cross party lines and shifted the focus of politics to issues of 
economics, paving the way for the New Deal.  But it occurred at the cost of 
sidelining questions of racial equality for many years. 
Although accommodation over race allowed both depolarization and the 
creation of the New Deal coalition, persistent pressures for racial justice, 
especially after World War II, began to drive cracks in the coalition, as 
described previously.  Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 
1965, the Republican Party became newly competitive in the South.138  Taking 
lessons from George Wallace, Republican politicians and the New Right 
learned how to use wedge issues to split the New Deal coalition and gradually 
reorganize American politics around issues of identity, religion, ethnicity, and 
race.139  The success of these strategies led to our current political system.  
Polarization grew during the 1970s and 1980s, but really took off during the 
1990s.140  Barack Obama’s election in 2008 increased polarization still 
further, producing partisan resentments the country had not seen since the 
Civil War and the Gilded Age.141 
Congressman (and later House Speaker) Newt Gingrich is a key figure 
in the modern history of political polarization in the United States.142  
Gingrich realized that polarization could make Republicans a majority party 
that could not only win presidential elections but also gain control of 
Congress.143  Gingrich and his allies developed a slash-and-burn style of 
politics that became a model for conservative campaigns, labeling political 
 
134. Id. at 34–36. 
135. Id. at 94–97, 107–10. 
136. Id. at 71. 
137. Id. at 191. 
138. VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Fred M. 
Shelley, et al., The Civil Rights Movement and Recent Electoral Realignment in the 
South, 47 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 13, 13–14 (2007). 
139. See Goudsouzian, supra note 85 (arguing that the Republican Party's 
strategy of polarization began with George Wallace's 1968 campaign and the 
emergence of the New Right). 
140. Lewis, supra note 4. 
141. Id. 
142. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT 
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW 
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 31–43 (2012). 
143. Id. at 33. 
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opponents as immoral, sick, and un-American.144  Republican operatives built 
on this strategy: they sought out wedge issues involving race, religion, and 
sexuality to fracture formerly Democratic majorities, placing culture war 
issues front and center.145  Another important factor was the rise of 
distinctively conservative media, including talk radio, Fox News, and later 
Internet sites like Breitbart.  Conservative media encouraged polarization by 
stoking cultural resentments and promoting the conservative movement and 
the Republican Party.146 
One of the consequences of the Republican strategy of polarization is 
that political polarization in the Reagan regime has been asymmetrical: 
Democrats have moved a little to the left, primarily because conservative 
 
144. SAM ROSENFELD, THE POLARIZERS: POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR 
PARTISAN ERA 268 (2017) (arguing that Gingrich “led the way” in developing the 
GOP's “highly disciplined and confrontational political strategy that would take 
partisan combat in both chambers to new heights.”); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL 
ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 146–51 (2018) (describing Gingrich’s strategy of 
demonizing his political allies);  MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 35– 39 (same); 
McKay Coppins, The Man Who Broke Politics, THE ATLANTIC, October 17, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt- gingrich- says- youre- 
welcome/570832/ [https://perma.cc/WG2Y-Y6BA] (“[F]ew figures in modern history 
have done more than Gingrich to lay the groundwork for Trump’s rise. During his two 
decades in Congress, he pioneered a style of partisan combat—replete with name-
calling, conspiracy theories, and strategic obstructionism—that poisoned America’s 
political culture and plunged Washington into permanent dysfunction.”). 
145. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 44 (describing consequences of 
Republican strategies of polarization). For a recent mea culpa by a Republican 
strategist detailing the deliberate use of race and racial grievance as wedge issues. See 
STEVENS, supra note 93. 
146. YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS, & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK 
PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 75–100 (2018) (arguing that conservative media have created a propaganda 
feedback loop that amplifies and encourages disinformation and conspiracy theories); 
Yochai Benkler, et al., Study: Breitbart-led right-wing media ecosystem altered 
broader media agenda, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php 
[https://perma.cc/NGN4-VA3W] (showing the emergence of a distinctive right-wing 
media disinformation system); NICOLE HEMMER, MESSENGERS OF THE RIGHT: 
CONSERVATIVE MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 260–61 
(2016); BRIAN ROSENWALD, TALK RADIO’S AMERICA: HOW AN INDUSTRY TOOK OVER 
A POLITICAL PARTY THAT TOOK OVER THE UNITED STATES (2019); Jane Mayer, The 
Making of the Fox News White House, THE NEW YORKER, (March 4, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/11/the-making-of-the-fox-news-
white-house [https://perma.cc/S2XM-772U] (describing how Fox News became a 
propaganda arm of the Trump Administration). 
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Southerners left the party, but Republicans moved considerably to the right.147  
The combination of a center-left party and an increasingly hard-right party is 
a characteristic feature of modern American politics.  While the Democratic 
Party resembles mainstream liberal parties in Europe, the Republican Party 
increasingly resembles authoritarian anti-immigrant parties in Turkey and 
Hungary.148 
A.  Racial Polarization in American Politics 
Race and racial issues were always important features of the Republican 
strategy of political polarization.149  They were key elements of the culture 
wars that helped Republicans win the South and become the majority party in 
the United States.  Accordingly, Republican politicians and operatives 
encouraged the organization of politics around racial resentments.150  Despite 
 
147. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 51–58 (describing asymmetric 
polarization); Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of 
Polarization, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 19– 26 
(Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013) (reviewing evidence of asymmetric 
polarization). 
148. Sahil Chinoy, What Happened to America’s Political Center of Gravity?, 
N.Y. TIMES, (June 26, 2019),  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/26/opinion/sunday/republican-
platform-far-right.html [https://perma.cc/KA2R-NVVY] (explaining that “The 
Republican Party leans much farther right than most traditional conservative parties 
in Western Europe and Canada," while "The Democratic Party, in contrast, is 
positioned closer to mainstream liberal parties.”); Anna Lührmann, et al., New Global 
Data on Political Parties: V-Party, V-DEM INSTITUTE, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 9, 26 
(Oct. 2020),  https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b6/55/b6553f85-5c5d-45ec-
be63-a48a2abe3f62/briefing_paper_9.pdf [https://perma.cc/577R-NDSW] (“[T]he 
Republican party in the US has retreated from upholding democratic norms in recent 
years. Its rhetoric is closer to authoritarian parties, such as AKP in Turkey and Fidesz 
in Hungary. Conversely, the Democratic party has retained a commitment to 
longstanding democratic standards.”); The Republican Party has lurched towards 
populism and illiberalism, THE ECONOMIST, (Oct. 31, 2020), 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/31/the-republican-party-has-
lurched-towards-populism-and-illiberalism [https://perma.cc/4QTN-CMTS]; Ivana 
Kottasová, US Republicans are starting to look a lot like authoritarian parties in 
Hungary and Turkey, study finds, CNN, (Oct. 26, 2020), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/26/world/republican-party-more-illiberal-study-
intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/39KP-9C2K]. 
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IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 98 (1992) (“Race was 
central, Richard Nixon and key Republican strategists began to recognize, to the 
fundamental conservative strategy of establishing a new, noneconomic polarization of 
the electorate.”). 
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this, for many years, both major political parties contained both racial liberals 
and racial conservatives, especially among voters who do not pay much 
attention to politics.151  Racial liberals are those who score lower on standard 
tests for racial resentment and thus are more likely to assert that racial 
inequalities are primarily due to present discrimination and the legacy of past 
discrimination.152  Racial conservatives are those who score higher on 
standard tests for racial resentment and thus are more likely to assert that racial 
inequalities are primarily due to the fact that minorities lack individual 
initiative and that whites are the more likely victims of racial discrimination 
through racial preferences.153 
In the 2000s, as the demographic transformation of the United States 
became increasingly apparent, race and attitudes about race became especially 
important factors in the country’s ever-increasing political polarization.154  As 
the percentage of whites in the voting population declined, white racial 
identity became increasingly self-conscious.155  The election of the nation’s 
 
decades/ [https://perma.cc/5S5E-768L] (arguing that “racial priming” by elites has 
been a key factor in the racialization of politics); see generally TALI MENDELBERG, 
THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF 
EQUALITY (2001) (arguing that politicians use terms like “welfare” and “crime” to 
manipulate white voters’ racial resentments); DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. 
SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996) 
(explaining how political elites frame issues to activate racial resentments). 
151. MICHAEL TESLER, POST-RACIAL OR MOST-RACIAL: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE OBAMA ERA 146–47 (2016); Chris Hayes & Michael Telser, Why Is This 
Happening? The rise of white identity politics didn't start with Trump explains 
Michael Tesler: podcast & transcript, NBC NEWS, (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/rise-white-identity-politics-didn-t-start-
trump-explains-michael-ncna926191 [https://perma.cc/V7FJ-PR97]. 
152. TESLER, supra note 153, at 21–22 (citing KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 
152); Hayes & Telser, supra note 153. 
153. TESLER, supra note 153, at 21–22 (citing KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 
152); Hayes & Telser, supra note 153. 
154. See TESLER, supra note 153, at 37–39 (arguing that because race is 
especially salient, it has been an important driver of political polarization).  
155. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Rise of White Identity Politics, WASH. 
MONTHLY, (July 2019), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july-august-
2019/the-rise-of-white-identity-politics/ [https://perma.cc/Q5W5-S4R3] (“White 
voters increasingly see themselves as a threatened ethnic group.”); ASHLEY JARDINA, 
WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS 139–40 (2019) (noting increase in white racial 
consciousness and fears that whites were a  becoming “a dispossessed minority”); 
JOHN SIDES, ET AL., IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE 
BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA 88–89 (2018) (noting survey research 
showing increasing concern by whites about discrimination against whites); ARLIE 
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first Black president, Barack Obama, in 2008, made the question of racial 
identity especially salient even to white voters who had not been paying very 
much attention to politics.156  
Despite Obama’s post-racial rhetoric and his (in hindsight, naïve) 
attempts to bring an end to the nation’s political polarization, his mere 
existence as a Black president helped to polarize attitudes about race among 
whites.157  The 2008 campaign and Obama’s election moved increasing 
numbers of racial liberals into the Democratic Party and racial conservatives 
into the Republican Party.158  Thus, Obama’s presidency accelerated an 
already existing trend toward the racialization of politics.  Divisions on 
political issues that appeared to have little to do with race – the Obama 
stimulus, tax cuts, and health care – increasingly became connected to whether 
white voters were racially liberal or racially conservative.159  As American 
politics became increasingly racialized, political polarization increasingly 
activated white racial identity.160 
This set the stage for Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and subsequent 
presidency.  By the 2016 election, Donald Trump was not even subtle about 
using race to energize the Republican base.161  He was happy to make 
obviously racist appeals,162 while brazenly insisting that he was the “least 
 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON 
THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016) (noting increasing concerns by whites that non-whites 
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157. TESLER, supra note 153, at 7, 158–64; Hayes & Telser, supra note 153. 
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 56(3), 690–704 (2012); Enders & Scott, supra note 
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on important issues including welfare and health care.”). 
160. Enders & Scott, supra note 152; Peter Baker, et al., Trump Employs an Old 
Tactic: Using Race for Gain, N.Y. TIMES, (July 20, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/us/politics/trump-race-record.html 
[https://perma.cc/F6G9-NB43]. 
161. German Lopez, Donald Trump’s long history of racism, from the 1970s to 
2020, VOX, (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2016/7/25/12270880/donald-
trump-racist-racism-history [https://perma.cc/H3EE-SJK8]. 
162. Baker et al., supra note 162; Lopez, supra note 163; John Cassidy, Trump’s 
Overt Racism Is Uniting Democrats and Unnerving Some Republicans, THE NEW 
YORKER, (July 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trumps-
overt-racism-is-uniting-democrats-and-unnerving-some-republicans 
[https://perma.cc/DB8U-KC42]; Ibram X. Kendi, Is This the Beginning of the End of 
American Racism?, THE ATLANTIC, (Sept. 2020), 
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racist person” one would ever meet;163 in the 2020 campaign he boasted that 
no President had done more for African Americans, with the possible 
exception of Abraham Lincoln.164  If appeals to race had previously been the 
not-so-secret strategy of Republican electoral success, Donald Trump let 
everyone in on the secret.165  As Thomas Esdall put it, Obama was an 
involuntary lightning rod for racial polarization, but Trump was a lightning 
strike, who deliberately provoked racial divisions to gain power.166  Trump 
managed to make white Democrats even more racially liberal and white 
Republicans even more racially conservative, heightening political 
polarization in the process. 
B.  Depolarization and a Second Progressive Era 
Is polarization a permanent feature of American politics?  In Cycles, I 
argue that many of the features that led to depolarization at the end of the First 
Gilded Age are likely to occur again.167 
Polarization seems enduring today because the culture wars have led to 
a politics organized around issues of identity – race, religion, and culture – on 
which compromise is difficult, if not impossible.168  The focus on these issues 
– along with the strategy of polarization – has thoroughly transformed the two 
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racism/index.html [https://perma.cc/DA45-5M72]; Eugene Scott, Six times President 
Trump said he is the least racist person, WASHINGTON POST,  
January 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2018/01/17/six-times-president-trump-said-he-is-the-least-racist-person/ 
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favorable views of racial minorities. But Trump's appeals were explicit.”); Baker et 
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N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/opinion/trump-
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major parties from where they stood at the end of the New Deal/Civil Rights 
regime.  But it has also produced incoherent party coalitions, each of which 
now has a populist wing and a neoliberal wing.169 
The Democrats, once a labor and working-class party with a strong base 
in the South, have become a cosmopolitan party, strong in the cities, the 
suburbs, and along the coasts.170  The Democrats’ base of support includes 
both working-class and business interests as well as minority voters.171  The 
Republicans, once a party of professionals and business interests centered in 
the North and the West, have been transformed into the dominant party in the 
Democrats’ old stronghold – the South.172  They have traded away large 
numbers of suburbanites and college-educated professionals for white 
working-class and rural voters, who coexist uneasily in a party supported by 
the business community and financed by a powerful base of wealthy 
donors.173  By 2020, the Republican Party seemed to be united only by cultural 
grievances and intense hatred of whatever liberals happen to be for.174 
Political coalitions are always in motion as newer voters replace older 
ones who die off.  I argue in Cycles that as American voting populations 
slowly evolve, the internal divisions within each party on issues of class and 
economic equality will grow larger, and the internal differences within each 
party will become more salient.175  These looming conflicts will begin to 
unravel our current structure of party coalitions polarized around zero-sum 
issues of identity, race, religion, and culture.  Economic issues will 
increasingly dominate.176  As this happens, politicians will find it easier to 
forge alliances across party lines on particular issues, leading to further 
depolarization – akin to what happened in the first several decades of the 
twentieth century.177 
That is my prediction, at any rate.  We will not know if it will come true 
for some time.  It is possible that the period of depolarization during the early 
twentieth century was just an anomaly that will never return.  But even if 
something like my prediction does happen, it raises a troubling question, if we 
think about the story from the perspective of race and racial equality. 
The last time depolarization happened, in the early twentieth century, it 
came at the expense of African Americans.  Issues of racial equality – and 
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problems of racist violence – were pushed to the side so that white politicians 
could make deals about the economy and government expenditures.  And 
when economic reforms did come during the New Deal, Southern Democrats 
made sure that African Americans got fewer benefits from many of the new 
programs, and they used the filibuster to prevent any progress on issues of 
racial justice.178 
Will the past be prologue?  Will depolarization in the twenty-first 
century come at the same price as depolarization in the twentieth – a political 
accommodation between whites that sidelines urgent issues of racial justice? 
There are reasons to think that depolarization will have different effects 
this time around.  By 2045, the U.S. Census predicts that racial minorities will 
collectively constitute a majority of the U.S. population, and whites will be a 
minority group.179  Both parties will eventually become multiracial coalitions.  
The Democrats are already there; the Republicans will take longer, for reasons 
I have already described.  Multiracial coalitions, because they wish to preserve 
cohesion, have incentives not to make issues of racial identity the central focus 
of politics.  In this political environment, racial minorities may find it easier 
to demand economic policies and social programs that respond to their 
interests. 
Unlike Republicans at the end of the nineteenth century, today’s 
Democrats simply cannot succeed as a national political party without voters 
who are not white.  It will be much harder for the Democrats of 2035 to sell 
out the interests of racial minorities than it was for the Democratic Party of 
1935.  An important difference between the early twentieth century and the 
early twenty-first is that political depolarization came after the Republican 
Party had already given up on protecting Black rights.  It is hard to imagine 
that the Democratic Party will behave the same way anytime soon. 
The story for Republican Party is a bit different.  The Republican Party 
has a core of voters whose racial resentments have been stoked and whose 
white racial identity has been activated.  As whites become a minority in the 
United States, both tendencies will probably get even worse.  White racial 
resentments will become sharper and appeals to white identity more overt.  In 
the short run at least, Republicans will remain a white person’s party, and 
Trumpian racial demagoguery will continue.  And because the debate about 
voting fraud has become racialized – especially following the 2020 election – 
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Republicans will continue to attempt to limit racial minorities’ access to the 
vote in order to win elections. 
Even so, Republicans will not be successful as a national party without 
attracting a growing number of Black, Latino, and Asian voters.  That means 
that the long-run problem for Republicans will be similar to that of the 
Democratic coalition during the New Deal: to find positions that both its white 
voters and the growing share of racial minorities it hopes to attract can agree 
on.  Solving this problem will lead Republicans, like Democrats, to focus on 
economic questions.  Cultural warfare will not go away, but it will shift to 
issues on which both conservative racial minorities and conservative whites 
can find common ground: moving from race and ethnicity to religion, personal 
morality, and citizenship status. 
In addition, the definition of who counts as “white” will probably 
change, as it did during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.180  Possibly 
many mixed-race people, Latinos, and Asians will be assimilated into the 
social status of being white (or whatever the successor term becomes), 
creating a new “white” majority.181  One should not assume, however, that 
this will end racial consciousness, much less cure racial inequalities.  Quite 
the contrary: the danger is that as whiteness is redefined, African Americans 
will continue to be excluded as the racial other.182 
We should not expect that a Second Progressive Era will be any more 
racially peaceful than the first one was.  American politics is still constructed 
around questions of identity and will be for some time to come.  And as whites 
come to understand themselves less as the political majority and more as a 
political minority, white racial consciousness and white racial resentments 
will increase.  Until both of the two major party coalitions have become fully 
multi-racial, we should expect that the racial politics of the next several 
decades will remain divisive and fraught.  The legacy of strategies of political 
polarization during the Reagan regime will be with us for some time to come, 
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and the flames of racial resentment fanned in the past two decades will not 
quickly die down. 
At the end of the book, I point out that it is possible to imagine occasional 
cooperation between the populist side of the Democratic Party and the 
populist side of the Republican Party on economic questions.183  But I also 
point out that this cooperation will depend on greatly on whether or not 
redistributive legislation and public goods programs can be presented as 
deracialized – as benefitting working-class Americans and their families 
regardless of race, rather than as benefits that will flow primarily to racial 
minorities and non-white immigrants.184  Associating government programs 
with race was the tactic used to galvanize opposition to President Obama’s 
economic stimulus bill and the Affordable Care Act.185  If political opponents 
successfully racialize reforms, Republican politicians will refuse to cooperate, 
and this will prevent cross-party coalitions.  In that case, it will be much harder 
to deal with problems of economic inequality in the United States. 
IV.  RACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ROT 
The third cycle described in the book involves episodes of constitutional 
rot followed by periods of constitutional renewal.  My discussion builds on 
the history laid out in the previous two Sections. 
A.  Constitutional Rot 
I define rot as the process by which governments become less democratic 
and less republican over time.186  “Less democratic” means that government 
becomes increasingly unresponsive to popular opinion and popular will.  
“Less republican” refers to various elements of republican decay: loss of 
public trust in institutions, loss of trust between political leaders of different 
parties, the breaching of norms of cooperation between members of different 
parties, the rise of demagogues who engage in propaganda and promote 
conspiracy theories, and pervasive political corruption.187  Loss of republican 
civic virtue means that elected representatives become increasingly less 
devoted to the public good, instead focusing on pleasing or paying off a 
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relatively small set of powerful individuals and groups who keep them in 
power.188 
I identify four key factors in constitutional rot, which I call the Four 
Horsemen of Constitutional Rot.189  The first is increasing economic 
inequality.  The second is political polarization.  The third is loss of trust 
between citizens and government, between members of different parties, and 
between political leaders.  The fourth factor is a series of policy disasters that 
show that the government is unable or unwilling to take care of its citizens 
and act in their interests.  All of the four horsemen are on the march in the 
United States today. 
Constitutional rot also involves the gradual decay of norms of 
cooperation between different parties that is necessary for multiparty 
democracy to function.190  Political leaders increasingly refuse to play by the 
rules of democracy and engage in various hardball tactics to stay in power, 
because they no longer regard their opponents as legitimate and fear allowing 
their opponents to have power.  Representative democracy requires 
acceptance of majority rule, and a willingness to give up power when a party 
fails to win the support of a majority.  When constitutional rot sets in, the 
dominant party is increasingly unwilling to accept democratic rotation in 
office.  Instead, politicians attempt to entrench minoritarian government.  
Thus, constitutional rot eventually leads to oligarchy or to authoritarianism, 
even if the country still holds elections and preserves the outward forms of 
representative government.191 
B.  Race and Constitutional Rot 
In Cycles, I point to three different episodes of constitutional rot in the 
nation’s history.  The first is the period just before the Civil War, when the 
Slave Power dominated American politics.192  Wealthy slaveholders used 
their economic power and the representational boost of the three-fifths clause 
to entrench their power in the federal government and to use their political 
power to expand slavery into new federal territories.193  After Abraham 
Lincoln’s election, Southern elites feared that they could no longer control the 
federal government and that the new Republican Party could not be trusted.  
They left the Union, precipitating the most important constitutional crisis in 
American history, the Civil War. 
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The second episode of constitutional rot occurred during the First Gilded 
Age, a period of growing economic inequality, strong polarization, demagogic 
politics, and deep political corruption.194  In Cycles, I argue that a third episode 
of constitutional rot is occurring today.  We are living in America’s Second 
Gilded Age, which has many of the same worrisome features as the First 
Gilded Age.195  In addition, today’s Republican Party, increasingly filled with 
radicals and authoritarians, and led by a racist demagogue, Donald Trump, 
has repeatedly undermined democratic norms.196  Facing the changing 
demographics of the United States, and fearful that it will be unable to win 
national majorities, Republicans have tried to maintain power through a series 
of strategies designed to entrench minority rule.197 
Race plays an important role in each of these three episodes of rot.  The 
Slave Power leveraged the ownership and exploitation of Black people to 
maintain control over American politics.  Gilded Age politicians used race as 
a means of stoking polarization and mutual hatreds between the two major 
political parties.198  Polarization led to a long period of political gridlock, 
during which wealth and income inequality mounted, and railroads and other 
business interests leveraged their financial power to gain even greater 
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advantages for themselves.199  As I noted earlier, racially polarized politics is 
also an important feature of today’s Second Gilded Age.200  Like the first 
Gilded Age, we also live in a period of sustained government gridlock and 
political corruption, in which politicians have used strategies of polarization 
to deflect attention from upward redistribution of income and mounting 
problems of economic inequality.201 
Although racialized polarization increased throughout the Second 
Gilded Age, President Donald Trump has exacerbated it by repeatedly 
drumming up symbolic fights about race and engaging in racist rhetoric.202  
Trump’s conspiracy theories surrounding the 2020 election played to the 
racialized polarization of American politics that he had helped inflame.  These 
conspiracy theories have asserted that illegal votes were counted – or that 
votes were stolen or altered – in urban areas with large minority 
populations.203  Trump’s attack on the legitimacy of the 2020 election was a 
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continuation of his attacks on the legitimacy of minorities exercising political 
power – the most famous being his claim that Barack Obama was not 
legitimately president because he was not born in the United States.204  
Trump’s attacks on racial minorities and on minority political power 
resonated with racially conservative whites who feared that they were slowly 
losing political dominance in the United States.205  It was hardly surprising, 
then, that many of the insurrectionists in the January 6, 2021 attack on the 
Capitol were members of white supremacist and white nationalist groups.206 
C. Constitutional Rot as a Relative Term 
Cycles does not argue that other periods in American history lack 
elements of constitutional rot.207  American democracy has never been fully 
democratic and never fully republican.  Subordinating racial groups violates 
both principles of democracy and republicanism, and American history is full 
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The country began with slavery and limited rights to vote.  Even after 
slavery was abolished in 1865, racial and economic inequalities continued, 
and got worse over time: Jim Crow and black disenfranchisement began at the 
turn of the twentieth century and continued for decades.208  Women did not 
obtain the right to vote nationwide until 1920.  Our modern conception of civil 
rights and civil liberties is barely a half century old, has always been 
imperfectly enforced, and has been repeatedly undermined by episodes of 
political retrenchment.  The redemption of American democracy remains an 
unfinished project.209 
The idea of constitutional rot, in other words is a relative conception.210  
It describes a period of backsliding from a period of relative improvement in 
democracy and republicanism that may have been unjust and imperfect in 
many respects.  
A similar point applies to periods of constitutional renewal.  
Constitutional renewal does not mean that all aspects of the constitutional 
system improve.  The constitutional system can get better in some respects 
and worse in others.  During the early Jacksonian period, for example, the 
right to vote expanded to include most white males.  But increasing 
democratization was accompanied by the exclusion of women, the expansion 
of slavery, and the forced relocation of Native Americans.211  In terms of 
democracy and republicanism, the Jacksonian era is simultaneously a period 
of progress and regress. 
Another example is the Progressive Era, which the book identifies as a 
period of constitutional renewal following the First Gilded Age.  During the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, progressives pushed for reforms in 
multiple areas, promoting greater democracy, securing women’s right to vote, 
opposing political corruption, breaking up monopolies, helping the 
downtrodden, and promoting greater economic equality.212  But race was the 
Progressive Era’s major blind spot.213  Some progressive reformers ignored 
racial inequalities while others, like Woodrow Wilson, actively made things 
worse.214  Educated elites embraced scientific theories of racism.215  Even as 
progressives sought to reform politics, Southern states became one-party 
regimes that disenfranchised Blacks and poor whites and brutally put down 
resistance.  Racist demagogues like Ben Tillman dominated southern politics, 
defending violence against Black people and refusing to accept majority 
government if it included rule by Black voters.216  The Progressive Era, for all 
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its achievements, was also a regressive era, especially when we focus on 
race.217  It was both an era of constitutional renewal and a continuation of 
constitutional rot. 
The lesson of the Jacksonian and Progressive eras is that when 
democratic renewal primarily concerns the expansion of democracy for 
whites, it often comes at the expense of racial minorities.  Conversely, periods 
of democratic renewal for African Americans, such as Reconstruction and the 
Civil Rights era, are often bitterly resisted by conservative whites who want 
to maintain the elevated status of being white.  The result in both cases has 
been that attempts at multi-racial democracy have been succeeded by periods 
of racial retrenchment, racialized political polarization, increasing economic 
inequality, and political corruption. 
It is hardly accidental that constitutional rot is connected to attempts to 
maintain racial hierarchy.218  Throughout American history politicians have 
tried to gain and maintain political power by deliberately polarizing politics, 
using race as a central tool of political polarization.  Whether or not these 
attempts have been successful in the short run, the long-term result has been 
constitutional rot. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Cycles of Constitutional Time ends with a warning that 
constitutional rot is a stubborn condition, and that eradicating it will take many 
years of political effort.219  Nevertheless, because the Reagan regime is 
nearing its conclusion, and because political coalitions are continually 
changing, Americans have a chance to alter the basic assumptions of 
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American politics and renew their democracy in the next few decades.220  
Whether Americans will succeed, of course, cannot be known at present.  
Things may even get worse before they get better.  All we have is possibility 
and hope, not certainty. 
Much will turn on how the two major political parties accept and 
accommodate themselves to the changing racial demographics of the United 
States.  To the extent that the parties become genuine multiracial coalitions, 
they will have incentives to deemphasize the racially polarized politics of the 
past forty years, and fight about economic issues that can appeal across the 
different parts of their coalition.  Just as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Democrats attracted Black voters because the latter saw that New Deal 
policies benefited them economically, both parties might find new ways both 
to attract and appeal to African Americans, Latinos, and Asians, who will 
collectively constitute the majority of voters by the middle of the twenty-first 
century. 
The Democrats are already well on the road to this reformation.  Because 
of the politics of the Reagan regime, and especially the Trump presidency, the 
Republican Party faces a greater challenge.  At present it seems backed into a 
corner as a white person’s party devoted to stirring up cultural and racial 
resentments to an ever-greater pitch to mobilize its shrinking base of white 
voters.  But, as noted above, the situation is actually more complicated: 
Republicans have powerful incentives to increase their share of non-white 
voters, and the party’s coalition continues to evolve. 
In this Article, I have argued that race and the politics of race have been 
important drivers of the cycles of constitutional time.  That is likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future, but with one important difference.  Up 
until now, the use of race in American politics has always operated under a 
particular set of assumptions: that whites are and will continue to be, the 
overwhelming majority of the country’s voters, and that all other groups are, 
and will continue to be, political if not numerical minorities.  For most of its 
history, American politics has been a struggle for political power between 
different groups of whites, with non-whites either excluded or relegated to the 
margins of political power.  In the years to come, we will discover what will 
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